Archive | Treasury

Government surplus jumps to $1.8 billion

The Crown accounts for the year to June show a surplus of $1.8 billion in 2015-16, up from $414 million in 2014-15.

Presenting the accounts yesterday, Finance Minister Bill English said they also showed core Crown expenses were under 30% of gdp for the first time since 2006, net debt had stabilised to 24.6% of gdp and net worth had grown to $89.4 billion.

Mr English said the $1.8 billion operating balance before gains & losses (OBEGAL) in 2015-16 was a significant turnaround from the $18.4 billion deficit in 2011 following the global financial crisis & Canterbury earthquakes. A $176 million had been forecast in the 2015 Budget.

obegal“Government surpluses are rising and debt is falling as a percentage of gdp, which puts us in a position to be able to make some real choices for New Zealanders.

“The New Zealand economy has made significant progress over the past 8 years. This delivers more jobs & higher incomes for New Zealanders, and also drives a greater tax take to help the Government’s books.”

Core Crown tax revenue was $1.6 billion higher than forecast in the 2015 Budget.

“We’ve also been getting on top of our spending, exercising fiscal restraint while still investing responsibly in our growing economy & public services. Core Crown expenses were $73.9 billion, below the forecast of $74.5 billion at the beginning of the year.

“We’ve focussed on results and are starting to address the drivers of dysfunction by investing in better public services. We remain committed to maintaining rising operating surpluses and reducing net debt to around 20% of gdp in 2020.

“If there is any further fiscal headroom, we may have the opportunity to reduce debt faster and, as we’ve always said, if economic & fiscal conditions allow we will begin to reduce income taxes.

“The outlook for the economy is positive, the Government’s books are in good shape and we are addressing our toughest social problems. However, we also need to bear in mind that there are a lot of risks globally and that is why it is important to get our debt levels down.

“Budget 2017 will make positive long-term choices to strengthen the economy & our communities.”

Mr English will release the half-year economic & fiscal update on Thursday 8 December.

Treasury snapshot

gdpTreasury’s snapshot of the accounts shows real gdp growth of 2.8%, nominal gdp up $10.2 billion to $251.8 billion, real gdp up $6.1 billion to $227.2 billion.

While the OBEGAL chart (operating balance before gains & losses) shows a $1.8 billion surplus, after gains & losses it shows a $12.6 billion turnaround from 2014-15 to a $7.2 billion net loss. Treasury said valuations of long-term liabilities resulted in large losses for the ACC insurance liability and the Government Superannuation Fund retirement liability: “These losses combined with the OBEGAL surplus resulted in a $5.4 billion operating balance deficit.”

The $1.3 billion cash deficit increased net core Crown debt to $61.9 billion, up $1.2 billion from last year, but core Crown debt shrank by half a percent as a proportion of gdp, to 24.6%.

Links:
13 October 2016: Government financial statements for June 2016 year
Treasury snapshot

Attribution: Ministerial release, Treasury.

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Treasury & minister slate living wage proposal: All the arguments are transparently flawed

Treasury produced analysis today to show the proposal for a living wage, put at $18.40/hour, would be “an ineffective way to help families with low incomes”.

Finance Minister Bill English not surprisingly rejected the proposal, promoted by Living Wage Aotearoa NZ, saying the Government’s economic programme was focused on increasing incomes and supporting more jobs, “and the best way to achieve that is through a growing & more competitive economy”.

Mr English’s contention wasn’t included in the analysis, but can be criticised just as easily: the growth theory equates to trickledown, which leaves any improvement for those at the bottom to chance, and leaves those least able to argue their case with a lower percentage gain which is also usually delayed; competition has been used to suppress wages, while salaries of those on higher incomes have ballooned, creating a much wider divide between top & bottom.

I didn’t write about the living-wage campaign when it was launched last year because it seemed futile. Fixing a dollar value on it would soon translate into that sum being a minimum, which would be inflationary, thus providing only short-term gain for those receiving this wage. Fixing it as a percentage of some level of executive income might work because that would create a direct relationship between upper & lower earnings groups but, like fixed exchange rates, that would also introduce problems, such as the inability to break out of the bottom band.

The Treasury analysis concluded that the living-wage proposal was an ineffective way to help families with low incomes, because:

  • Many low-income earners are people below the age of 30 who are single or part of a childless couple, and the extra earnings by parents would result in reduced tax credits or benefit payments (as they abate with higher income)
  • If it was adopted as a minimum wage, New Zealand would be out of line with other countries, and it is likely to reduce employment, particularly of younger people trying to enter the labour market
  • The overall impact on poverty levels is likely to be small, but it would represent a change of focus from supporting families with children towards supporting young, single people.

Mr English said the Treasury advice showed it would be likely to cost jobs and be unlikely to lift average wage rates. It surprised me to see the second of those conclusions in the report, because raising the average wage shouldn’t be the aim.

If the living wage raised the average it would achieve nothing: all boats would rise with the tide. If it lifted earnings at the bottom and reduced the margin between top & bottom, however slightly, it would achieve its purpose.

Aligned with this, the Treasury analysis concluded: “The minimum wage has grown much faster than average wages over the last decade, and this has not led (to) New Zealand becoming a higher wage economy.”

That conclusion means one of 2 things: The minimum wage has succeeded in reducing the margin between top & bottom, or gains in other wage brackets have been suppressed. If the correct conclusion is the first of those options, Treasury’s analysis would be defeating its own argument that setting an earnings base would damage the economy. As inflation is still low, suppression of other wage brackets seems more likely, and that defeats Mr English’s argument that competition will grow (or is growing) the economy.

Another Treasury conclusion was truly out of left field: “Adoption of the living wage would be likely to put some industries, such as retail trade, at a disadvantage compared to overseas competitors.”

The exchange rate puts the whole New Zealand export trade at a disadvantage, but neither the Government nor the Reserve Bank has done anything about that because the standard answer, cutting interest rates without taking any accompanying measures, would be reflected in further speculation in housing.

Mr English said the living-wage campaign claimed a minimum hourly pay rate of $18.40 was necessary for a family of 2 adults & 2 children, but the Treasury analysis “shows that not just the figure, but the concept, is flawed.

“It might sound politically attractive to be able to dial up a preselected made-up wage rate, but for higher wages to be sustainable they have to be based on productivity & affordability in real workplaces.

“The ‘living wage’ idea is based on a 2-adult, 2-child family, yet analysis shows that people in this situation make up only 6% of families earning less than $18.40/hour. Almost 80% of those earning less than $18.40 are people without children, including young people & students.

“The analysis shows that the ‘living wage’ would least help low-income families, whose welfare support would abate as their income rose. In those cases, the main beneficiary of the living wage would effectively be the Government, because it would receive more in tax and pay out less through abated transfers….

“Business confidence is strong & growing, which is a good sign that more employers will take on new workers and pay a bit more. It is increased business confidence and new investment that lifts employment & wages in a real & sustainable way.”

Links: Treasury release
Treasury analysis

Attribution: Ministerial & Treasury releases, Treasury analysis.

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EQC levy to treble, English still positive about deficit

Published 12 October 2011

Finance Minister Bill English made 2 related announcements yesterday – one to treble Earthquake Commission levies, the other to still talk positively about removing the Government’s operating deficit despite an $18.4 billion net deficit for the June 2011 year.

Mr English said the increase in Earthquake Commission levies was to realistically reflect costs. The levies will rise early next year to help rebuild the commission’s natural disaster fund.

Insured homeowners currently pay 5c/$100 of insurance cover up to a maximum of $69/year (including gst), as part of their insurance premiums. Under the proposed changes, homeowners will pay 15c/$100 of insurance cover, with an annual cap of $207 (including gst).

The increase will take effect from 1 February, increasing annual levy revenue from about $86 million to about $260 million. Mr English said it would:

provide revenue to meet the commission’s operating costs, which for many years had been subsidised by the disaster fund’s investment income, and to cover higher reinsurance costsenable the commission to rebuild the fund to its pre-Canterbury earthquake level of $6 billion in about 30 yearsreduce the commission’s estimated $1.2 billion cash shortfall to $490 million, reducing the amount the Government may have to provide under its Crown guarantee.

Mr English said: "Raising levies for those who benefit from earthquake insurance cover is the fairest way to ensure the commission can meet its long-term costs. The levy rise will add about $2.65/week to most homeowners’ insurance bill.”

On the Government’s overall financial state, Mr English said the outgoing Government remained committed to halving the budget deficit this year – and again next year – before returning to surplus in 2014-15.

The Crown’s accounts for the June year, released yesterday, show an $18.4 billion operating deficit, including net expenses of $9.1 billion for the Canterbury earthquake last year.

“This is an unusually large deficit, but it includes the significant costs of the Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Fund and the updated assessment of Earthquake Commission costs.

“Setting aside the earthquakes, we’ve made good progress compared to estimates 5 months ago in the Budget. A combination of higher-than-forecast revenue and lower-than-forecast spending has reduced the underlying deficit by about $2.8 billion. However, this was more than overshadowed by the higher earthquake costs.”

Despite the Canterbury earthquakes, Treasury noted economic growth was better than expected in the first half of 2011, driven by a recovery in domestic demand & higher export prices.

Mr English said Treasury would issue the pre-election fiscal & economic update (Prefu) on Tuesday 25 October.  

Link: Cabinet paper, Earthquake Commission

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Attribution: Ministerial releases, story written by Bob Dey for the Bob Dey Property Report.

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Treasury publishes 4 working papers on debt, saving, housing market, Crown risk management

Published 4 January 2010

Treasury published 4 working papers on its website on Christmas Eve:

 

TWP09-03 Household Debt in New Zealand, an assessment of the extent & composition of household debt in New ZealandTWP09-04 Saving Rates of New Zealanders: A Net Wealth Approach, a comparison of several different ways that are used to measure New Zealanders’ saving rates, and the different results from eachTWP09-05 A Simple Model of Housing Rental and Ownership with Policy Simulations, a description of a model of domestic housing that can be used to analyse the impact of housing policy proposals. The model includes rental & owner-occupied housing, andTWP09-06 Improving the Management of the Crown’s Exposure to Risk, an examination of management of the Crown’s exposure to financial risk, with a conclusion that the Government should do more to measure, monitor & control its exposure to risk.

 

I’ve run separate stories on the first & third of them, and will look at the other 2 this week.

 

As with all the Treasury working papers, “the views, opinions, findings & conclusions or recommendations are strictly those of the authors…. The papers are presented not as policy, but with a view to inform & stimulate wider debate.”

 

Links: Treasury, working papers

Treasury working paper, household debt

Treasury working paper, Housing market model

 

Related 4 January 2009 stories: Treasury publishes 4 working papers on debt, saving, housing market, Crown risk management

New model released to evaluate housing market policy interventions

Treasury paper indicates at-risk couples up by a third in 4 years

 

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Attribution: Treasury release, story written by Bob Dey for the Bob Dey Property Report.

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Treasury paper indicates at-risk couples up by a third in 4 years

Published 4 January 2010

Projections in a Treasury paper on household debt indicate a rise in at-risk couples from 6000 to 8000 over the 4 years to 2008.

 

Treasury researchers Katy Henderson & Grant Scobie produced one of 4 papers which the Treasury released on Christmas Eve. It was written in response to recognition that the total debt of the household sector had risen appreciably in recent years.

 

“This has led to concerns about ‘excessive’ borrowing, and to the possibility that some households may have become unduly vulnerable in the event of unexpected shocks. This paper draws on both aggregate & household level data to:

assess the extent & composition of household debtanalyse the distribution of debt in relation to incomeexamine the factors associated with high ratios of debt servicing relative to income, andconsider the extent to which individuals & households are vulnerable to unexpected shocks.”

 

The research showed that, between 1982-2007, household debt grew from 33% to 149% of household disposable incomes. However, due to the faster growth of assets, net wealth grew from 319% of disposable income in 1982 to 430% by 2002 and 604% by 2007 – ie, even before the sharp rise in house prices, the overall balance sheet of households was stronger in 2002 than any time in the previous 2 decades, despite the increase in debt levels.

 

Mortgages represented about 85% of total liabilities, the balance made up of credit card debt & student loans. Higher absolute debt levels among couples were associated with home ownership and higher levels of assets & income. Maori & Pacific Island couples recorded liabilities some $6500 greater than European couples.

 

The paper defines those as vulnerable as having debt servicing obligations exceeding 30% of their gross income. The authors estimated that 6.2% of non-partnered individuals and 8.1% of couples fell into this category in 2004: “When the underlying levels of income, asset values & mortgage interest rates were adjusted to correspond to values in 2008, it is estimated that these proportions doubled.”

 

Those at risk were defined as having debt servicing obligations exceeding 30% of their gross income and, at the same time, recording negative net wealth. “In part, negative net wealth arises because of lack of any assets that match the liability of student loans. Some 1.9% of individuals were deemed at risk, falling to 1.5% when student loans were excluded.

 

“Student loans distort the net wealth estimates of those holding them, as only the liability with no corresponding asset is recorded. When this is allowed for, the share of non-partnered individuals at risk drops further.”

 

The unit record data ended in 2004. However the paper makes projections to 2008: “For non-partnered individuals, there was little or no change in our estimate of the proportion with negative net wealth who also had debt servicing costs exceeding 30% of their income (ie, at risk). However, for couples, our estimate of the proportion at risk rose from 0.8% to 1.1%, corresponding to an increase from about 6000 to 8000 families.”

 

In summary, Ms Henderson & Mr Scobie said, “the overall position of household balance sheets in New Zealand does not appear to be a cause for concern. A caveat to this is the relatively high proportion of housing in both assets & liabilities, leaving households more exposed to changes in the housing market than they would otherwise be with a more diversified portfolio. The proportion of families who could be considered at risk is low. In the case of non-partnered individuals, once the effect of student loans is allowed for the share drops further. However, at least for couples there appears to have been an increase in vulnerable families between 2003-04 & 2008, although the absolute numbers are still quite small.”

 

As with all the Treasury working papers, “the views, opinions, findings & conclusions or recommendations are strictly those of the authors…. The papers are presented not as policy, but with a view to inform & stimulate wider debate.”

 

Links: Treasury, working papers

Treasury working paper, household debt

Treasury working paper, Housing market model

 

Related 4 January 2009 stories: Treasury publishes 4 working papers on debt, saving, housing market, Crown risk management

New model released to evaluate housing market policy interventions

Treasury paper indicates at-risk couples up by a third in 4 years

 

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Attribution: Treasury paper & abstract, story written by Bob Dey for the Bob Dey Property Report.

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New model released to evaluate housing market policy interventions

Published 4 January 2010

Treasury released a working paper on Christmas Eve which can be used to evaluate the impacts of a range of policy interventions in the housing market.

 

One thing the authors – Andrew Coleman of Motu Economic & Public Policy Research and Grant Scobie of Treasury – worked out was that owner-occupancy rates weren’t a particularly helpful guide to the state of the housing market. As with all the Treasury working papers, “the views, opinions, findings & conclusions or recommendations are strictly those of the authors…. The papers are presented not as policy, but with a view to inform & stimulate wider debate.”

 

The story below doesn’t venture into particular conclusions on specific policy shifts. But one point the authors have made is this: “For the last 2 decades New Zealand has had some of the highest real interest rates in the world. Were New Zealanders able to borrow at real interest rates closer to world averages, housing affordability could improve by an amount that would dwarf any likely effect of interventions that subsidise owner-occupancy.”

 

The 2 authors developed the initial version of this paper when they were affiliated with the house prices unit in the Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet in 2007. Their objective was to develop a simple model that captures the essential features of the supply & demand for housing, and which can be used to evaluate the impact of a range of policy interventions.

 

Interventions they simulated demonstrated:

increases in the stock of housing would reduce rents & house pricesa reduction in tax concessions for landlords would raise rents and moderate house pricesadditional subsidies for owner-occupancy would tend to reduce rents and raise house pricessignificant reductions in rents & house prices would follow a fall in the cost of housing through, for example, lower regulatory & consent costsfalling real interest rates result in lower rents, higher house prices & lower owner-occupancy rates.

 

“To date, models that simultaneously capture the incentives facing homeowners, landlords & developers have been large & extremely complicated. The principal aim of this paper is to develop a simple model that, while abstracting from much of the complexity, captures the essential dual nature of housing as both a consumption good and an investment good. The model incorporates owner-occupiers, a rental sector & a construction sector.

 

“The second aim of the paper is to analyse the effects of different policy options. Examples include:

 

policies that lower the marginal costs of housing (eg, through changes to regulation of land use, consent processes & building codes)policies that support the demand for housing (eg, housing related welfare payments); policies that influence the demand for home ownership through taxes & subsidies (eg, changes in the taxation of investment income from rental housing), andpolicies that change the cost of mortgage finance.

 

The authors used the model to simulate how house prices, rents & the quantity of rented & owner-occupied houses are affected by these different policy interventions. In turn, these variables could be used to calculate the owner-occupancy rate. In each case, the long-run (equilibrium) state of the housing market was calculated, but the authors said the model was silent on the dynamic adjustment path that house prices might take in moving from one state to another in response to a policy change.

 

“The analytical approach developed here can be used to guide policy formation in 2 ways. First, it indicates the scale of the change in a policy instrument that may be needed to achieve a given target level of an outcome variable in the housing market. For example, a policy analyst might wish to ask how much new dwelling construction would be needed to generate a rise of 5 percentage points in the owner-occupancy rate. Secondly, it can provide insights into the confidence that can be placed on these estimates by indicating how the answers depend on the various parameters in the model. To this end, we show how some results are indeed sensitive to a range of values for key parameters.”

 

The simulations investigate the consequence on the housing market of 5 different classes of policy interventions or economic shocks: changes in the number of houses, tax concessions to landlords, home-ownership subsidies, construction costs and interest rates. The model shows how rents, house prices, the number of houses and the owner-occupancy ratio are impacted by the changes.

 

“An important insight stemming from these simulations is that the owner-occupancy rate is a very poor measure of the state of the housing market. The owner-occupancy rate could be increased by 1% by any one of the following policies: the Government could build (& sell) 375,000 houses, construction costs could fall by 29%, real interest rates could increase by 48%, the Government could reduce the tax concession available to landlords by 29% (or about $1200/property) or the Government could increase the subsidy to owner-occupiers by 53% (or about $2500/household).

 

“The first 3 of these changes represent enormous interventions. However, they are large not because these interventions have little effect on the housing market but because they change the incentives facing landlords & homeowners in the same way, so induce only minor changes in the owner-occupancy ratio.

 

“For example, the reduction in construction costs that increases the owner-occupancy rate by 1% lowers house prices by 22%, rents by 11% and increases the quantity of houses by 4%. The change in interest rates that has the same effect on the owner-occupancy rate lowers house prices by 15% but raises rents by 22% and reduces the quantity of housing by 8%.

 

“In these cases the owner-occupancy rate says little about the overall state of the housing market. Clearly the former change has better housing market outcomes than the latter.

 

“Even in the case that a policy intervention has a direct effect on the incentives facing landlords or homeowners, the owner-occupancy rate is a poor measure of the state of the housing market. For example, a rise in the owner-occupancy rate can be induced by either an increase in the tax on landlords or an increase in the subsidy for homeowners.

 

“The former raises rents, lowers house prices and reduces the quantity of housing; the latter lowers rents, raises house prices and increases the quantity of housing. The distributional implications for those who rent and those who already own homes are clearly different, yet the effect on the owner-occupancy rate is the same.

 

“Part of the problem is that the owner-occupancy rate largely misses the way that households endogenously form or dissolve in response to changes in rents & house prices.

 

“Overall owner-occupancy rates can fall even if the number of young households owning their own home increases. This is because household formation can change in response to lower rents. There may be more couples deciding to split up because they can afford to live separately (with at least one renting). Young people & students may leave home earlier than otherwise and rent. Flats of 4 people may form 2 flats of 2 people, or flats of 2 people may choose to live as singles.

 

“All of this increases the number of renting households and improves welfare, without decreasing the number of people owning their own home. Hence, as more households form, the owner-occupier rate may fall, merely because of greater numbers of people choosing to rent. This result carries no implication that overall welfare was lower, and highlights the need for caution when using the owner-occupancy rate as either a target for, or an indicator of, public policy in the housing sector.

 

“The model suggests that, in the medium term, the largest effect on housing affordability would result from either lowering construction costs or reducing real interest rates. A 10% reduction in either would increase the quantity of housing by 1.5% and lower rents by 4%. Both would reduce the financing cost of owning a house by 7% although, in the event that real interest rates declined, house prices would rise and owner-occupancy rates would fall.

 

“Both changes are feasible. First, real construction costs were at record levels in 2007 as a result of a construction boom. It therefore seems likely they could fall as demand pressures ease. Furthermore, current policy initiatives could well reduce some elements of the various regulatory & compliance costs. In addition, for the last 2 decades New Zealand has had some of the highest real interest rates in the world. Were New Zealanders able to borrow at real interest rates closer to world averages, housing affordability could improve by an amount that would dwarf any likely effect of interventions that subsidise owner-occupancy.

 

“2 critical factors influence the success of any intervention in the housing market. These are the responsiveness of the supply of rental property to the rate of return to investors and the responsiveness of the construction s
ctor to house prices.

 

“Rents, house prices & the quantity of rental units are all much more responsive to a change in the investor returns when the supply elasticity of rental property with respect to returns is higher rather than lower. Unfortunately, little is known about this parameter, or the factors that influence entry & exit of investors into the residential property market. The importance of this parameter in the model suggests that it is a prime topic for further research.

 

“The model also shows that the way demand conditions affect house prices depends critically on the elasticity of the total supply of housing with respect to prices. This underscores the importance of regulatory & consent procedures that facilitate rather than hinder the growth of the housing stock. The speed that housing supply responds to demand shocks is particularly important in an environment where demand shocks such as changes in interest rates or migration inflows & outflows are common. If the supply of housing responds only slowly to demand shocks, price bubbles may occur, resulting in exaggerated swings in the housing market.”

 

Mr Coleman & Mr Scobie acknowledged imperfections in their model. They said its tractability required some simplifying assumptions, but it then treated the housing market as a national integrated market of houses of uniform quality, and thus made no allowance for regional patterns. Nor did it explicitly address differences in the quality of housing. However, that wasn’t a huge issue: “To the extent that regional markets and the markets for houses of varying quality are linked, this is not as serious a limitation as might first appear. A change in one part of the market will have flow-through effects on other regions. In regard to quality, the quantity supplied & demanded can be thought of as applying to standardised housing units that have incorporated an adjustment for quality.”

 

A second limitation was that the model was purely static: “It allows us to consider the market with or without a change in taxes, for example, but is silent on the adjustment path from the existing to the new position. As it focuses on the fundamental drivers of the housing market, it abstracts from the role played by expectations in determining house prices in the short run. This is quite appropriate when choosing between different long-run housing policies. In this case, the short-run dynamics are of less concern. Nonetheless, there is considerable evidence that house prices fluctuate excessively in the short run because price expectations in housing markets are not fully rational. For this reason, it may be worth adding dynamic elements to the model to enhance its capacity to track short-run movements in house prices.”

 

The data showed that, on a per capita basis, the total number of houses increased by only 4% over the 15-year study period. In sharp contrast, the number of rental units increased by 23%. “Almost all of the rental increase took place between 1996-2001. During this period real house prices increased by 110% while real mortgage rates declined by 60%. Thus the real financing cost of purchasing a house declined by 44% between 1991-2001, before increasing by 53% between 2001-06. The fact that there was almost no change in the per-capita quantity of houses demanded over the 15 years – despite these enormous variations in house prices & interest rates – suggests that the elasticity of total housing demand with respect to the price of housing must be very small – probably less than 0.1.

 

“The data appear to be more informative about the effect of rents on the demand for rental property. Between 1996-2001, there was almost no change in real house prices but a 9% decrease in real rents. Real mortgage rates declined from 8% to 5%, making home ownership somewhat more attractive. During this period the total number of houses (normalised for population) increased by 2%, while the number of rental houses increased 19%.”

 

Lastly, the authors noted: “An important feature of the New Zealand housing market in the last 4 years has been the declining size of the average household. The average number of people in each house declined steadily from 3.8 to 2.96 from 1966-1991, or by 1%/year. It declined a little further between 1991-2006 to 2.84.

 

“Several factors have been behind this trend. Amongst these has been a sharp decline in the average size of households with children, most notably a sharp decline in the number of families with 3 or more children. Between 1966-91, the fraction of households with 5 or more people declined from 28% to 13%. Secondly, there has been a big increase in the number of households comprising a single person or a couple.”

 

Links: Treasury, working papers

Treasury working paper, household debt

Treasury working paper, Housing market model

 

Related 4 January 2009 stories: Treasury publishes 4 working papers on debt, saving, housing market, Crown risk management

New model released to evaluate housing market policy interventions

Treasury paper indicates at-risk couples up by a third in 4 years

 

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Attribution: Treasury working paper & abstract, story written by Bob Dey for the Bob Dey Property Report.

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